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Telling Benign BITS Jobs from Malicious Ones
Updaters fill the BITS queue. How to sort jobs by owner, URL, destination, notify command, settings and creating process, with the patterns seen in real cases.
TL;DR. Most BITS jobs belong to Windows components and updaters. Start with the jobs that have a notify command line, then read the owner, the URL, the destination, the name, any retry settings that differ from the defaults, and the process that created the job. A notify program in a writable folder, on a job owned by an ordinary or new account, pointed at a raw IP address, 127.0.0.1 or an unknown host, is the pattern of the public cases. Then compare across hosts: updater jobs repeat across a fleet, an intruder's job usually does not. No single check is a verdict. BITS Parser flags persistence and suspicious transfers so that you start with the right jobs.
What normal looks like
BITS serves Windows Update and other Windows components, as Mandiant's write-up notes, and third-party updaters such as Acrobat Reader's, per Xavier Mertens's ISC diary. Two public references show what that looks like:
- BitsParser's own example is a job named
SpeechModelDownloadJob, owned byNT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE, in the suspended state (README). - Matt Green's allowlist. His Velociraptor artifact Windows.EventLogs.Bitsadmin filters event 59 with a list of domains he built from network logs: Microsoft, Windows Update, Office 365 and
office.net,live.com, OneNote, OneDrive'soneclient.sfx.ms,aka.ms, Google'sgvt1.comdownload hosts, Adobe, Mozilla, Oracle and Sun, Dell and HP, and private address ranges.
That is one environment's view. A domain allowlist also hides any abuse of the same services, so use it to sort, not to clear.
Two more things shape what you see. Completed and cancelled jobs leave the queue, so the live queue shows jobs in progress, suspended or waiting, not a history. And jobs owned by a user only run while that user is logged on, so a job can sit for weeks on a laptop whose user rarely signs in.
The checks
| Check | Why it matters | Benign look-alikes |
|---|---|---|
| A notify command line is set | It is the persistence mechanism of ATT&CK T1197 | Software that uses the documented feature |
The notify program is in a writable folder (ProgramData subfolders, Users\Public, %TEMP%, AppData, INetCache) | Dropped tools live there: Mandiant's KEGTAP job ran mail.exe from INetCache | Per-user applications installed under AppData |
The notify program is cmd.exe, powershell.exe, regsvr32.exe or another script host | A one-line loader: the Secureworks jobs ran cmd.exe to write a batch file that loaded the download with regsvr32.exe | Rare |
| The notify parameters do not pass the job ID | Microsoft's own example passes the job GUID so that the program can open its job | Programs that take the ID another way |
| The owner is an ordinary user, or an account created recently | Command-line callbacks run as a user, not as a service account (Microsoft) | Per-user updaters |
| A service account owns a job with a notify command | Microsoft says it will not run; BITSInject made one run by editing the queue file | None known |
The URL host is a raw IP address, 127.0.0.1, a domain new to your logs, or plain HTTP for an executable | Mandiant's persistence example and KEGTAP both used localhost; Secureworks listed 19 delivery domains | Internal update servers on private addresses |
| The destination is an executable, DLL or script, in a writable folder | Download and run | Installers and self-updating software |
| The name or folder imitates a vendor or the system ("System update", a GUID-like folder) | Blending in | Real vendor jobs: check that the software is installed and the URL belongs to the vendor |
The name is BITS Transfer | Start-BitsTransfer's default name (Nardella, JPCERT) | Administrators' scripts |
| Retry delay or no-progress timeout differs from 600 seconds and 14 days | Someone set it on purpose | Applications that tune their jobs |
Event 3 names bitsadmin.exe, powershell.exe, a script host or an unknown program | The real client of the job | Administration scripts, management agents |
| The job sits in error or transient error with a notify command, or in transferred and is never completed | The states that start the command | Jobs waiting for a network or a logon |
| An upload job to an unfamiliar host | Exfiltration: ATT&CK lists APT39 using BITS to exfiltrate data | Applications that upload logs or backups |
| The job exists on one host only | Intruder jobs rarely repeat across a fleet | Software installed on a single host |
None of these is a verdict on its own. Two or three on the same job are worth a full look, and the notify command line is worth reading every time.
How the notify command works, and why its owner and retry delay matter, is in BITS persistence.
Read the whole job
The two documented intrusion cases look nothing like an updater once all the fields are side by side:
| Field | Mandiant, KEGTAP (2020) | Secureworks (2016) |
|---|---|---|
| Name | "System update" | Not given in the text; two near-identical jobs |
| URL | http://127.0.0.1/tst/56/ | One of 19 delivery domains, such as big4u.org |
| Destination | mail.exe in the user's INetCache | A .d file in a GUID-like folder under C:\ProgramData |
| Notify command | mail.exe itself | cmd.exe writing and running x.bat |
| What the command did | Started the KEGTAP backdoor | Called bitsadmin on its own job, then loaded the file with regsvr32.exe |
| Found through | Bits-Client events 3, 61 and 64, then the database | Unusual Bits-Client events, then the database |
Sources: Mandiant and the Secureworks analysis republished by Sophos. In both, the job outlived the first malware: Secureworks was called in because alerts continued after antivirus had removed the original infection.
A benign job, by contrast, tends to tell a consistent story: the owner matches the software, the URL belongs to the vendor, the destination is the vendor's folder, and the same job exists on every host with that software.
Stack across hosts
On one host, every field is an opinion. Across a fleet, rarity becomes evidence.
- Group jobs by name, URL host, destination folder, notify program and owner type. Count hosts per group.
- Group event 59 URLs by host name. Matt Green's artifact ships a notebook that stack-ranks them; the bottom of the list is where to look.
- Group event 3 by creating process, on builds that record it.
svchost.exeand known agents fall away;bitsadmin.exeandpowershell.exestand out. - Join the leftovers to process creation logs and Prefetch for the command lines.
Jobs that left the queue
A one-off download with bitsadmin /transfer or a synchronous Start-BitsTransfer completes its job, and the job leaves the queue. What remains:
- events 3, 59, 60 and 4, with the URL and, on recent builds, the creating process (event IDs);
- carved records in the database and its transaction logs (the qmgr.db format);
- the downloaded file, and the
BIT*.tmpcreation and rename in$MFTand the USN journal; - the
bitsadmin.exeorpowershell.exetraces of whoever ran it.
The same checks apply to these remnants: URL, destination, owner and client.
Upload jobs
An upload job sends a local file to a server. In the job record its type is upload, and in events 59 and 60 the URL is the receiving server. ATT&CK lists BITS upload as a way to exfiltrate data. Check the local file named in the job, the server, the size, and whether the job's time matches other signs of staging, such as an archive created just before.
In BITS Parser
BITS Parser lists every job with its files, owner, notify command line and times, and flags persistence and suspicious transfers. Treat each flag as a pointer to the checks above, not as a conclusion. Export the result as CSV or JSON to stack it with other hosts, or as Markdown for the report. Everything runs in the browser; nothing is uploaded.
FAQ
Is a BITS job with a notify command line always malicious?
No. Microsoft documents the feature for applications, so legitimate software may use it. Read the program path, its signature, the parameters, the owner and the URL. A notify program in a user-writable folder, on a job owned by an ordinary user and pointed at an unusual URL, is the pattern of the public intrusion cases.
Which accounts own normal BITS jobs?
Windows components and services can own jobs as service accounts, as BitsParser's NETWORK SERVICE example shows, and per-user software owns them as the user. Microsoft states that notify command lines do not run for service-account jobs, so a working malicious notify command normally sits on a job owned by a user account.
What does the job name BITS Transfer mean?
It is the name Start-BitsTransfer gives a job when no display name is set, as Roberto Nardella's SANS paper and JPCERT's test show. It points to PowerShell, or to a script that uses the cmdlet. It is not a sign of malice by itself.
Should I look at completed BITS jobs?
Yes, through the event log and carved records. Completed and cancelled jobs leave the queue, so a one-off download made with bitsadmin /transfer or a synchronous Start-BitsTransfer usually survives only in events 3, 59, 60 and 4, in carved database records and in the file system.
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Frequently asked questions
Is a BITS job with a notify command line always malicious?
No. Microsoft documents the feature for applications, so legitimate software may use it. Read the program path, its signature, the parameters, the owner and the URL. A notify program in a user-writable folder, on a job owned by an ordinary user and pointed at an unusual URL, is the pattern of the public intrusion cases.
Which accounts own normal BITS jobs?
Windows components and services can own jobs as service accounts, as BitsParser's NETWORK SERVICE example shows, and per-user software owns them as the user. Microsoft states that notify command lines do not run for service-account jobs, so a working malicious notify command normally sits on a job owned by a user account.
What does the job name BITS Transfer mean?
It is the name Start-BitsTransfer gives a job when no display name is set, as Roberto Nardella's SANS paper and JPCERT's test show. It points to PowerShell, or to a script that uses the cmdlet. It is not a sign of malice by itself.
Should I look at completed BITS jobs?
Yes, through the event log and carved records. Completed and cancelled jobs leave the queue, so a one-off download made with bitsadmin /transfer or a synchronous Start-BitsTransfer usually survives only in events 3, 59, 60 and 4, in carved database records and in the file system.